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MIŁOSZ: ON CIRCUIT
Abstract: This paper undertakes a critical examination of Czesław Miłosz’s negative 
responses to contemporary art in general, and American modernist poetry in particular. 
It focuses on Miłosz’s interpretations of Cézanne’s statements and Wallace Stevens’s 
poems, and concludes that the Polish poet’s inability and unwillingness to appreciate 
contemporary art results from his recognition and approval of mimetic representation 
as the only strategy which guarantees rationality, certainty, a sense of metaphysical 
hierarchy and which is informed by them. Quoted are Miłosz’s somewhat angry 
reactions to the concepts of abstract, non-fi gurative art as well as his words of 
admiration for the representational moment apparently inherent in both poetry and 
painting. Parenthetically, the paper points to Miłosz’s repressed feelings of existential 
and epistemological ambivalence, arguably the most valuable aspect of his work.
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1.
Let me begin with a digression. In Andrzej Franaszek’s biography of 
Czesław Miłosz we fi nd a brief and lively description of the poet provided 
by Stanisław Vincenz:
He is completely mad (…) one sentence contradicts another. I was not able to 
comprehend all those contradictions until I fancied an image, contradictory in 
itself, of an insect, a ground beetle belonging to the Carabidae family, pinned 
to the ground: its legs are running but the pin holds it down (Franaszek 2011: 
499; trans. A.K-P.).
This description was sketched at the beginning of the 1950s, a period 
particularly diffi cult for Miłosz, yet it can serve as a point of departure for 
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an overall psychological portrait of the Polish poet, be it the 1950s or the 
1990s. A bit earlier, in the 1940s, Polish novelist Jerzy Andrzejewski point-
ed to similar contradictions informing Miłosz’s worldview. In one of his 
letters to the poet, Andrzejewski wrote about “two opposing visions of the 
world.” He added: “Your intellectualism or the observer’s position, as you 
call it, gives me the impression of anxiety in a man who is running around 
a furniture-cluttered room, but is unable to fi nd a spot to sit down, thinking 
that none deserves his trust” (Miłosz 2009: 173, 245; trans. A.K.-P.). 
Signifi cantly, both Vincenz and Andrzejewski underlined the moment 
of movement, constant search, the never-ending formation of a worldview 
of the Polish poet. Also, they emphasised his want of a defi nite position as 
well as his fondness for strong phrases, stemming not so much from the 
limitations or exhaustion of language but rather from the overfl ow of the 
intellectual, existential and linguistic profusion that cannot be contained 
and ordered. Unable to cope with the overabundance of impressions and 
words describing them, and yearning for defi nite ideas and perspectives, 
the poet kept turning to new aspects of reality and realms of imagination 
and tried to fi nd in them a justifi cation for his own existence. Characteristi-
cally, he disregarded the fact that such a justifi cation cannot be thought of 
independently from concrete reality.
True, Miłosz does his best to be specifi c. Yet, even though he succeeds 
to do so in his poetry, in his critical commentaries he usually falls into 
vague, abstract modes of discussing many things at once. He channels his 
critical interpretations in such a way that his arguments often contradict 
one other. It is probably not a question of inconsistency. The author of 
“Rescue” attempts to do justice to the whole of reality and unavoidably 
falls prey to the dream shared by every realist – that of grasping the fullness 
of being and expressing the thing in its “thingness.” That is why he multi-
plies perspectives and binds together heterogeneous ideas. In this Miłosz 
resembles Hegel, who in The Phenomenology of Spirit starts from the here 
and now in order to move smoothly, by way of circular cancellations and 
uplifts, to successive stages in the history of the Absolute, where all partic-
ulars and individual attributes are ideally conciliated in the name of a few 
universals. The movement neutralizes all positions, perspectives, opinions 
and views. What counts is the vague and inaccessible goal, the truth or 
epiphany of reality – the rest is only a path leading towards that destina-
tion. Essential is the energy of that movement. After all, the destination is 
not clearly defi ned and the direction remains virtually unknown. The mo-
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mentum itself is as important as its target. Of course, all tendencies should 
have a purpose. Sooner or later, though, there comes a moment when the 
poet is carried away by the sheer energy of the movement and the critical 
mumbo-jumbo ensues.
Miłosz was a creature of ambiguity. In poetry he managed to accom-
modate it, but in his sketches and essays he stumbled over it, scurried to 
and fro, fi nding a footing and losing it almost immediately. Undoubtedly, at 
their best, his critical texts are paragons of what essay writing may amount 
to. However, their greatness is also their curse. Once an essay by Miłosz is 
over, we are left with the impression of a barren, tautological circle consist-
ing of forceful but repetitive arguments, a circuit striving to encompass all 
history, all humanity, all reality, but in the end encompassing only itself. 
End of digression.
2.
Within the space that can provisionally be called Miłosz’s American space,1 
there is a curious trope essential for our understanding of the attitude and 
views of the Polish Nobelist. What I have in mind is the accusatory tone 
that Miłosz regularly assumes in his criticism of both 20th-century Ameri-
can poetry and contemporary culture and art (non-fi gurative painting in 
particular). Miłosz treats these domains indiscriminately. His criticism of 
contemporary poetry is quite often mixed with his condemnations of new 
art. His tone is decided and the allegations take the form of a totalizing 
1 Miłosz’s America is one huge dilemma. His attitude towards the American continent 
was marked by an array of ambiguous feelings and seems to be most clearly articulated in 
a passage from a 1962 letter to the Wat family: “The experience of America has always 
baffl ed me beyond words. There are many layers to it: stopping at one falsifi es all the oth-
ers” (Wat 2005: 230; trans. A.K-P.). These sentences seem to hold true for the whole time 
Miłosz spent in America. At the very beginning, murkier tones and pessimism prevailed. 
Later, things looked a little brighter, but even in his diary entries in A Year of the Hunter 
(written between 1987 and 1988), beside the undeniable fascination, one can sense a note of 
alienation and longing for Europe. The descriptions of American nature teem with ambiva-
lence: on the one hand, they are impersonal, bleak landscapes of deserts and rocky shores; on 
the other, they brim with fl ora and fauna. The poet’s attitude towards American culture and 
civilization is equally ambiguous: he admired the resourcefulness of the fi rst settlers but his 
admiration was combined with a harsh criticism of the capitalist society. It is diffi cult to say 
whether Miłosz found his feet in America. Vincenz’s comparison with a ground beetle seems 
to me extremely accurate here.
Przekładaniec_2.indd   93 8/29/2013   11:05:54 AM
94 JACEK GUTOROW
accusation. The poet does not take into consideration individual works or 
gestures, neither does he try to delve into possible differences between 
them. He treats contemporary art as a certain whole and inscribes it into 
a somewhat apocalyptic scheme of time whereby the modern era becomes 
an age of dehumanization, degeneration and nihilism.
The perspective outlined by Miłosz is panoptic and designed to encom-
pass the entire history of civilization. Were we to understand it, we would 
have to refer to Miłosz’s omnipresent Gnosticism that permeates his aes-
thetic views and literary criticism. I can only mention here this interesting 
and important context, but it undoubtedly provides material for a whole 
book. Its potential author would have to tie together the Manichean, eso-
teric and aesthetic threads, bringing to light their mutual links, discussing 
their interrelatedness and pointing out the fact that they resonate and circu-
late endlessly within the bounds of the poet’s eschatological vision. Miłosz 
inscribes his reading into a historical perspective, essentially foreclosing 
the possibility of a temporary, partial and accidental interpretation. This 
approach holds true even for his poetic epiphanies supposed to provide 
a breach in the historical structure of being. Signifi cantly, Miłosz places 
epiphanies in the historical context reaching back to polytheism and Juda-
ism (at the beginning of the fi rst section of A Book of Luminous Things 
we actually read that epiphany “interrupts the everyday fl ow of time and 
enters as one privileged moment when we intuitively grasp a deeper, more 
essential reality”; this passage is immediately followed by remarks on the 
historical meaning of epiphanic experiences (Miłosz 1998: 3).
What comes to the foreground here is a negative idea of America. 
Miłosz’s criticism is directed primarily against the poetry of Anglo-Amer-
ican Modernism, both in its early experimental stage and at its fi nal high 
phase informed by such great poems as The Cantos or Paterson as well as 
by recognitions formed by the acolytes and advocates of the New Critical 
school. The Nobelist’s pessimistic vision of modernity is characteristically 
fused with his ambivalent approach towards American culture and civiliza-
tion in general. 20th-century poetry is for Miłosz one of the main manifesta-
tions of the downfall of artistic imagination, and even though he does not 
mince words over post-war European literature, his bitter critical remarks 
on the American poets seem to me particularly symptomatic.
Miłosz’s criticism of American poetry must be judged as unjustifi ed and 
to a great extent incomprehensible. It is also surprising in the work of the 
poet who is evidently indebted to what he has discovered in the poems and 
manifestos of high Modernism. After all, his own poetic work comes to 
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similar conclusions, reaches similar diagnoses and operates by way of sim-
ilar rhetoric, evoking similar reactions in its readers. Why then condemn 
the great poetic tradition that gave rise to such artists as Pound, Crane, 
Williams, Stevens, Moore or (somewhat later) Bishop and that can boast 
such poetic achievements as Eliot’s The Waste Land, Crane’s The Bridge, 
Stevens’s long poems or Williams’s Paterson?2 Why criticize something so 
close and familiar to one’s own tastes and artistic gestures?
Miłosz’s harshly critical stance was not a coincidence. On the contrary, it 
grew out of his strong belief in the dehumanization and degeneration of con-
temporary art, which in turn stemmed from earlier processes, most impor-
tantly from the crises within Christianity and the emergence of the scientifi c 
paradigm. In this context his criticism of Anglo-American modernism was 
only one facet of the overall critique of 20th-century art, particularly experi-
mental art that elaborated on the discoveries of impressionism (in painting) 
and French symbolism (in poetry). Miłosz repeatedly refers to the nega-
tive genealogy of modern and postmodern art: not being able to compete 
with the scientifi c paradigm, poetry and painting have adopted scientifi c 
or pseudo-scientifi c methods, separating themselves from collective experi-
ences and turning into marginal disciplines cut away from reality and thus 
diffi cult to grasp.
Since Miłosz recognizes that the weakness of contemporary poetry is 
due to the crisis of art in general, a discussion with his theses has to be 
global and must take into consideration the overall negative meaning and 
implications of his statements on poetry, painting and occasionally on 20th-
century music (although here he seems to tread with more caution). The 
poet seems unwavering in his assumption that any serious argument on the 
state of modern art has to include a gnostic vision of the world, a critical 
assessment of post-Cartesian and post-Enlightenment culture, a question-
ing of experimental as well as avant-garde poetry and prose. Importantly, 
in his own comments on contemporary American and European literature 
Miłosz rarely abandoned a broader and universal perspective embracing 
2 The full analysis of numerous parallels between Miłosz’s poetry and modernist proj-
ects falls outside the scope of this article. Importantly, many poems written by Miłosz after 
World War II seem heavily indebted to such authors as Eliot, Auden or Jeffers. It is hard to 
overlook the fact that Miłosz followed the patterns set by the great modernists (especially 
in his long poems). He was also familiar with the modernist concepts of impersonal poetry 
and, like modernists, voiced his preference for the anti-symbolic poem concentrating on the 
hard, palpable texture of things. It should be immediately noted, however, that the parallels 
are also parallaxes – and it is them that I want to point out in my essay.
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religious views, psychological and social constraints as well as historical 
and political contexts.
One cannot help asking more or less obvious questions, though. Is it re-
ally true that contemporary art has strayed away from the primary existen-
tial and epistemological experiences and has moved towards metadiscours-
es rooted in science or pseudoscience? Can one imagine a reliable position 
from which such a judgment may be passed? Have we really witnessed 
a radical change of paradigm? And, most signifi cantly, is it not the case 
that Miłosz’s dream of the “second space” (title of his important volume), 
the space of imagination and spirit, turns into a strongly paradigmatic and 
in fact scientifi c narrative with clearly articulated ideas of the order of sub-
ject and object, the me and the not-me, the perception and the perceiving 
consciousness? Has this critic managed to eschew the rhetorical effects he 
condemns? Such questions cannot be answered positively. Miłosz himself 
rarely dealt with them and never tried to address them in a critical mode 
(although we fi nd answers in his best poems). All in all, the problem with 
the Polish poet is due not so much to the fact that he criticized modernity 
but rather to the fact that his violent critique was self-contradictory, as it 
revived the very paradigms it questioned so vehemently.
3.
Noteworthy in this context is Miłosz’s encounter with the poetry and criti-
cal writings of Wallace Stevens. The subject is immense, and it allows wide 
margins of uncertainty. I can only touch upon the issue whose explication 
and analysis would require a much greater degree of critical attention and 
energy. It is, pointedly, not only the question of two individual poets, but 
also the problem of two clashing visions of poetry and opposing cartogra-
phies of the self. It is the mapping out of the trajectories almost parallel but 
never quite overlapping: rather, the trajectories wide apart.
We now know that in the 1940s Miłosz took meticulous notes on the 
margins of Stevens’s writings.3 For a long time, however, he did not ex-
press his opinion on the American poet. It is also diffi cult to discover in 
3 At present the notes are stacked in the Beinecke Library. Most of them were written 
in the 1950s and concern Stevens’s critical volume The Necessary Angel (I would like to 
express my gratitude to Ewa Kołodziejczyk, who provided me with the information and sent 
me a copy of an unpublished article written by Miłosz in 1948).
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any of Miłosz’s poems even a single trace of the poetic idiom characteristic 
of the Hartford recluse. Only in a 1989 conversation with Joseph Brodsky 
Miłosz was in a way summoned to answer: “Wallace Stevens is a complete 
mystery to me. I am full of confl icting feelings about him. He fascinates 
and repulses me at the same time, so my attitude towards him is very am-
bivalent” (Miłosz 2011: 391; trans. A.K.-P.). Ambivalence again! In two 
later comments included in the Polish edition of the anthology A Book of 
Luminous Things, Miłosz takes a more critical stance. When introducing 
his translation of The Poems of Our Climate, he announces:
Describing things not for their own sake, but in order to make them serve our 
own purposes is disloyal: it is already an abstraction or theory that Cézanne 
hated so much in painting, as he demanded the entire attention to be directed 
at the secret of the thing in itself. I do not think that the following poem by 
Stevens discusses a porcelain bowl and carnations, as its subject matter is crea-
tivity, poetry. He only seems to write about reality, whereas in fact the text is 
a self-refl exive poem. I am not going to conceal my distaste both for this whole 
dirty business and for Stevens’s poetry (Miłosz 1994: 85; trans. A.K.-P.).
And another passage:
He was defi nitely a 20th-century poet, which is to say that he thought all the be-
liefs and religious tenets of humankind to be a supreme fi ction. Only art, which 
for him meant poetry, remained as a great fantasy of our species that we weave 
out of ourselves like a silkworm spinning its thread. Still, Stevens lived entirely 
under the rule of the scientifi c worldview of his time and his examination of 
the visible world is marked by the infl uence of the scientifi c method (Miłosz 
1994: 87; trans. A.K.-P.).
For the admirers and attentive readers of Stevens’s poetry, these revela-
tions might come as a great surprise. After all, Stevens insisted more than 
once that he wrote on behalf of reality, and that all his poetic effort was di-
rected at exhausting the rhetorical potential of language, which only then, 
after coming to its limits, may venture to represent “things as they are” (the 
phrase is a refrain of the 1937 poem “The Man with the Blue Guitar”). The 
sentence concerning Stevens’s surrender to the infl uence of the scientifi c 
paradigm is barely comprehensible. Stevens continued the traditions of ro-
mantic poetry and transcendental philosophy, repeatedly and convincingly 
dismantling Cartesian, post-Cartesian and Enlightenment discourses and 
narrations; the spirit of parody and pastiche visible in his poems is most 
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often directed against the language associated with the poetics of scientifi c 
positivism, realism and logic.4
Let us note another contradiction in Miłosz’s comments, a contradiction 
that can be found in many of his statements and has rarely been used in 
discussions on his views of poetry and its role in the contemporary world. 
As it is, the poet’s obsessively repeated call for objectivity is permeated 
with the scientifi c rhetoric which implies that we can separate reality and 
language, and that the latter is transparent. Paradoxically, Miłosz’s com-
ments tend to reproduce the Cartesian separation of the matter (substance, 
material substrate, spoken or printed word) and the spirit (meaning, sense, 
message). This idea is also traceable in the mimetic notion of literary trans-
mission – the reality becomes the object of description and experience, 
and therefore is removed into a distance, thus becoming obscured by the 
universe of signs that were supposed to bring it closer. What we have here 
is a closed circuit of argumentation which seems to be convincing when it 
stands on its own but which incessantly repeats its own movement, distanc-
ing itself from any reality.
One wants to protest. There is no innocent, pure, unequivocal language. 
Every single sentence is subjected to rhetorical distortion. This is true espe-
cially in the case of those statements which in the name of the hypothetical 
purity of the medium try to question their own rhetorical status. It is here 
that the most serious gap opens between the opinions of the modernists 
4 Let me mention in passing another dimension of contemporary art overlooked by 
Miłosz: the sphere of play and disinterestedness. The latter appears in Kant’s Critique of 
Judgement, a book not taken into consideration by Miłosz. When Miłosz writes about “real-
ity (…) demanding a hero, but (…) also (…) an organizing idea” (1992: 112), when he de-
mands from a poem “mental articulatedness” (1990: 143; trans. A.K.-P.), when he describes 
it as “an expression of universal experiences” (1990: 29; trans. A.K.-P.) and perceives in it 
“a mimetic expression of truth” (1990: 75; trans. A.K.-P.), he pursues a defi nition of poetry 
as a kind of marketable art: it is always supposed to be benefi cial, as it would be unthink-
able to have the idea of poetry whose sole rationale for existence was in itself. Here perhaps 
Miłosz’s Manichaeism (understood as a belief that the world around us is an obstacle to 
overcome, and therefore to be used as a tool) is most truly revealed. At this level, selfl essness 
and disinterestedness are unacceptable, as they presuppose a moment of approval and accep-
tance: we do not want to gain anything, but rather identify ourselves with reality and accept 
our own lives. In this context it would be very interesting to compare Miłosz with Beckett, 
the master of free and profi tless interplay of signs and gestures, and above all with Simone 
Weil, who bears the comparison with the Polish poet on a much deeper level. Stevens also 
alludes to Weil and mentions her notion of “decreation” several times in his post-World War 
II texts: this Cézannean term opens up the space for yet another discussion that I continue 
elsewhere (Gutorow 2008 and 2009: passim).
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and the theses voiced by the Polish poet. One of the most recognizable 
features of the poems written by Stevens and by other advocates of Anglo-
American modernism is a strong awareness of the rhetorical ambivalence 
of language. In stark contrast to them, Miłosz defended unequivocality and 
literality. His ideal was a literal and transparent utterance. I am far from 
claiming that the Polish poet was striving for a scientifi c representation 
of reality. But it is hard not to notice that his appeals for a simple and 
immediate poetic message reconstruct traditional aporias they attempt to 
overcome. 
Furthermore, one can compare Miłosz’s and Stevens’s opinions of the 
late impressionistic paintings of Cézanne. As is well known, Cézanne was 
one of Stevens’s favourite painters. Miłosz admired the painter, too, but for 
radically different reasons. In his preface to A Book of Luminous Things 
he refers to the well-known and popular biography of Cézanne written 
by the painter’s friend Joachim Gasquet. He pays special attention to the 
passages where the French artist is presented as a eulogist of nature and 
a maker trying to imitate reality in the most accurate way. Let me quote 
three characteristic statements by Cézanne that were cited by Gasquet and 
then repeated by Miłosz: “My method, my code of rules, is realism” (Gas-
quet 1991: 170); “whatever I may do, I cannot get rid of the notion that this 
tree is a tree, this rock a rock, this dog a dog” (Gasquet 1991: 162); and 
“a minute in the life of the world passes. To paint that minute in its precise 
reality! Forgetting everything else for its sake. To become that minute. To 
be, in other words, the sensitized plate. To convey the image of what we 
see, forgetting everything that appeared before” (Gasquet 1991: 154).
The reason why the author of Three Winters chose exactly these sen-
tences is obvious – they do convey the sense of the mimetic pact so dear 
to the Polish poet. Miłosz’s Cézanne is a stubborn verist who shies all 
the novelties and avant-garde inclinations and rejects languages of moder-
nity. He also continues the tradition developed by such artists as Constable 
or Courbet. This Cézanne is an artist consciously situating himself on the 
junction between two developmental lines present in European 19th-cen-
tury painting: hard realism aiming at the creation of ideal copies versus 
romantic transcendentalism that penetrates reality and searches within it 
for the ultimate, irrefutable reason for existence. According to Miłosz, it 
is not the impressionists but Cézanne that comes to draw defi nite conclu-
sions from the intersection of these two currents; the transcendent gaze of 
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the painter does not stop at the perception of things but creates objective 
analogues of things.
Is this a pertinent interpretation? There is not one single answer to such 
a question. Obviously, the Provençal recluse might be called a painter of 
reality. What is not so clear, however, is how he perceived the status and 
mode of representation. What does it mean to “render reality” in a paint-
ing? Is it not the case that the artistic accuracy is in its essence the accuracy 
on the part of the observing consciousness? Is the latter subjective or ob-
jective? Polish art critic Wiesław Juszczak rightly highlights the multidi-
mensional nature of Cézanne’s work and diffi culties with characterizing it: 
“so far, the interpretation of this art has been insuffi cient on many levels, 
and one thing is certain – it will never be brought to a defi nite conclu-
sion” (Juszczak 1985: 189; trans. A.K.-P.). Already in Gasquet’s book we 
encounter numerous statements that complicate the vision of Cézanne as 
a painter of nature. Think, for example, of the famous sentence which is 
his artistic creed of sorts: “Painting from nature is not copying the object, 
it is realizing sensations” (Gasquet 1991: 46). It is not an exceptional or 
incidental statement, as Cézanne’s late paintings concentrate on the search 
for the essence of phenomena and on the consistent march towards abstract 
art, or at least the kind of art that would reveal the mechanics and laws of 
our perception. Cézanne does not keep it secret that the search for reality 
must involve a reconstruction of the represented world – and this is where 
he ceases to function as a convenient argument in the discussion on the 
superiority of the mimetic pact. As Juszczak adds, “the trace of this shared 
principle of reconstruction is in the shape and the rhythm of the patch of 
colour, the hidden geometry of solids, the breach of the perspectivist con-
ventions” (Juszczak 1985: 195; trans. A.K.-P.). Starting with an intuition of 
the object, the one informed by numerous perceptions, the French painter 
arrives at cubism and abstraction, lines and shapes. Here is a world that 
demands yet another restatement. 
What is questioned here is not the existence of reality but the status 
of perception with all its dilemmas and aporias. Moreover, the moment of 
activism and participation inherent in the reconstruction of the represented 
world allows for a more complete relationship with the so-called reality. 
Cézanne’s reconstruction does not distort reality. On the contrary, it brings it 
closer. After all, reality is not a static object of observation (as the Cartesian 
or Enlightenment models would assume) but a part of ourselves; the part 
that undergoes constant changes and therefore demands an entirely differ-
Przekładaniec_2.indd   100 8/29/2013   11:05:55 AM
101Miłosz: On Circuit
ent approach. It is quite astonishing that Miłosz, who obsessively traced the 
signs of the scientifi c paradigm in contemporary culture, would at the same 
time defend the dualistic mode of cognition, where the cognizable and the 
cognizant are two static, stable, inherently identical qualities. It would be 
easy to demonstrate that such an objectifi cation of the cognitive process 
comes very close to the model that might be called the scientifi c paradigm.
4.
Cézanne’s lesson: contemporary art should be a reconstruction of the rep-
resented world, “a passionate pursuit of the Real,” in Miłosz’s own words 
(I’m referring to his Harvard lecture “The Lesson of Biology,” 1983: 56). 
The phenomenological interpretation of Cézanne’s aesthetics will follow 
exactly this lead. Accordingly, in his well-known texts Maurice Merleau-
Ponty argues that the originality of the French painter resided in the new 
mode of perception of reality. Instead of imitating it in, say, a primitivist or 
naturalist fashion, or rendering subjective feelings and perceptions as the 
impressionists did, the painter should be able to demonstrate how things 
become things, even before they have become concrete objects and before 
we have discerned them from the surrounding reality. Cézanne’s greatness 
would reside in his ability to doubt the world around him, as well as in his 
ingenuity in revealing the process during which the chaotic mass of shapes 
and colours becomes the “world” to us. Only the painter is able to see the 
bare texture of things. As Polish critic Jacek Migasiński writes on the mar-
gin of Ponty’s texts, 
one looks at things without any obligation to evaluate them (…) they are not 
the objects of cognition or action. One’s unprejudiced attitude sets one free 
from them and the whole world, that is, a direct access to them is gained by 
means of attentive eyes and the painting hand (1995: 68; trans. A.K.-P.).
I cannot engage here into a more extensive analysis of the phenomeno-
logical interpretation of Cézanne’s painting, so let me cite a few sentences: 
The painter’s vision is not a view upon the outside, a merely “physical-optical” 
relation with the world. The world no longer stands before him through repre-
sentation; rather, it is the painter to whom the things of the world give birth by 
a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 
181). 
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And: 
seeing is not a certain mode of thought or presence to self; it is the means given 
me for being absent from myself, for being present from within at the fission 
of Being only at the end of which do I close up into myself (Merleau-Ponty 
1964: 186). 
One more passage: 
We are so fascinated by the classical idea of intellectual adequation that paint-
ing’s mute “thought” sometimes leaves us with the impression of a vain swirl 
of significations, a paralyzed or miscarried utterance (...) this disappointment 
issues from that spurious fantasy which claims for itself a positivity capable of 
making up for its own emptiness (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 189).
I do not quote Merleau-Ponty to question or invalidate Miłosz’s in-
terpretation. As it has already been mentioned, Cézanne’s paintings and 
commentaries can be read in many different ways. It is just to prove that 
the unfortunate equation of modernity and unintelligibility completely 
misses the mark. Modern art is by all means intelligible, it just needs to 
be experienced and interpreted at the level of a direct sensation, stripped 
from the teleological and metaphysical perspective imposed by conscious-
ness. Incomprehensibility? No, it is rather a lack of readiness to accept the 
world the way it appears in everyday experience and one’s unwillingness 
to abandon a vision of the organized and circular world (remember, we 
are discussing a certain circuit, a tautological rotation of ontological and 
eschatological narratives). 
Just like Cézanne seen from the phenomenological angle, the Ameri-
can poets of the modernist turn tried to come closer to reality with the 
full awareness of the open-endedness and inconclusiveness of the process, 
realizing that the path of a simple, direct experience can indeed meander. 
Sooner or later we come across the question of the limits and power of lan-
guage. Is a perceiving consciousness not a part of what it perceives? If so, 
should it not abandon the schematic division into the cognizing subject and 
the object of cognition? Does not the idea of the “mimetic pact” involve 
an imitation of reality in its most radical forms? What about so-called real-
ist art? Is it not a typical manifestation of the scientifi c consciousness that 
strives for the objectifi cation of our cognition and a discovery of some ir-
refutable truths and unequivocal meanings? These are just several of many 
questions that Miłosz did not try or did not want to cope with.
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5.
When one reads great Modernist poets, it becomes apparent how much 
importance they attach to the moment of participation and coexistence. 
Language is for them not only a medium but also an aspect and a part of 
the world which it tackles. A work of art loses its abstract dimension and 
becomes concrete, corporal, singular, made real by its very presence. As 
Archibald MacLeish wrote in the poem “Ars Poetica”: “A poem should 
not mean/ But be” (1985: 106). This imperative would be whole-heartedly 
embraced by Stevens, for whom poetry was a part of the world and not 
its exposition or paraphrase. Since the very beginning of his poetic career 
Stevens underlined the fact that the poet, like the painter, does not express 
reality but participates in the process of its becoming here and now; he 
does not follow it but discovers it within oneself, in one’s own life, and in 
others.5
5 Examples are manifold. At the time when he was composing poems that would form 
his fi rst collection, Stevens was most intent on obtaining the desired sound and musical ef-
fects – the sound of language became not only a quality in itself but formed a part of the 
poem’s message, occasionally supplanting the meaning of individual sentences, metaphors 
and images. Just like Eliot, Stevens was initially infl uenced by French Symbolists. If we 
were to follow Miłosz’s terminology, we would have to describe the poems included in 
Harmonium in terms of deviation and degeneration. The question is whether such a direct 
description would be possible. I do not think so. Even in those poems where the word play 
and the importance of sound seem to turn into pure poetic play, the poet has a specifi c pur-
pose in mind. A good example of this strategy is “The Comedian as the Letter C,” one of the 
most signifi cant poems of Harmonium. The language of the poem is that of overwhelming 
sophistication, and the meaning of its individual words is stifl ed by the effects of the poet’s 
fl amboyant style: the melody of the sentence seems to be more important than its message. 
Is the world of the poem unreal? Yes, if we assume that reality is a certain construct of 
consciousness. No, if we believe – and this is precisely the subject of Stevens’s poem – that 
consciousness is a part of reality understood as a process of becoming itself without end. 
Ornate language refl ects well the tribulations of a sensibility that does not stop at individual 
experiences and does not divide them into epiphanies but takes the world in en masse, in all 
its chaotic richness.
An important context is provided by Stevens’s 1937 sequence “The Man with the Blue 
Guitar,” whose title refers to a painting by Picasso. Both the painting and the poem are varia-
tions on the idea of Cézanne’s reconstruction of the world achieved by its unmaking, decrea-
tion and the never-ending process of reassembly. From the perspective of Miłosz’s notion of 
art, both works should be considered as deviant acts devoid of any fi rm footing and stripped 
of a “metaphysics of form” (the term taken from Miłosz’s important essay “Punkt widze-
nia, czyli o tak zwanej drugiej awangardzie” [A Point of View: On So-called Second Avant-
garde]; 1990: 148). Miłosz does not notice how closely form and reality are tied in Picasso 
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In contrast, Miłosz’s ideal poem – a faithful representation of reality – 
seems to make sense only against the backdrop of the scholastic and Carte-
sian separation of the body and the thinking substance. It loses its truth and 
effi cacy once the model exhausts itself, and this is what usually happens to 
binary models. Much of what we call modern poetry, and I guess Anglo-
American Modernism is a special case here, seems to have realized this. 
That is why it distanced itself from any grand narratives and concentrated 
on the medium of language – not to turn reality into a play of signifi ers but 
to let it be and not just announce itself by way of signs. Miłosz does not 
seem to notice that avant-garde movements not only did not betray reality 
but actually wanted to render reality in its full, moving beyond the division 
into the body, consciousness and the world. Hence his problem with the 
understanding of the modernist sensibility that appeared as a reaction to the 
Cartesian model of cognition and human being. 
As a matter of fact, Miłosz never believed in poetry as a self–fulfi ll-
ment. In his important poem “Meaning” we have the key image of a voice 
cruising in endless circles:
there will remain
A word wakened by lips that perish,
A tireless messenger who runs and runs
Through interstellar fi elds, through the revolving galaxies,
And calls out, protests, screams.
   (Miłosz 2006: 569)
There is something nightmarish about this image, a silent confession 
of the impossibility of overcoming the tautology of the “self,” a constant 
and Stevens. Deformation and transformation of reality belong not only to the sphere of artis-
tic creativity, but fi rst and foremost have a metaphysical and existential dimension: they are 
most metaphysical since the question of being implies temporality and an inevitable chasm 
between the thing itself and its phenomenon; they are also existential since one’s conscious-
ness is trapped in that chasm. Miłosz’s acceptance of the mimetic pact is nothing else but 
a confi rmation and a proclamation of the gap between consciousness and the world. Picasso 
and Stevens take an opposite approach as they subvert the mimetic order, which allows them 
to open art to the possibility of meaning beyond meaning, beyond language, and this by the 
very fact of the metonymic re-integration with reality, or rather processes that we call reality.
The vision of the world in Stevens’s late works is touched by the tragic, but we never 
fi nd there any Manichean inclinations: what is tragic is not the world we live in, but the con-
sciousness that cannot fi nd within the world a place for itself; in turn, the aim of art is not to 
imitate the order of the world organized by consciousness (as we know, Milosz repeatedly 
and obsessively writes about the need to preserve hierarchy), but to go beyond the circle of 
sensibility mistaking its own tragic condition for the condition of the world.
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elevation of oneself to the status of reality. The poem highlights Miłosz’s 
tight hold on the fi gure and fi gurativeness of his own language, as if it 
were impossible to get away from it, as if everything had to be literal and 
expressed verbatim. Modern art opposes literality and this is the source of 
its ambiguity. It is impossible not to notice that at the same time it forms 
a kind of protest, but the protest is directed against the oversimplifi cations 
and the dialectic roundness of the Enlightenment mind. This is something 
Miłosz could not or would not accept. In his poems we fi nd moments of 
self-doubt but these are always accompanied by a vision of a true, un-
disputed, imperial “I” that constitutes the primary criterion for the poetry 
which by necessity is imitative and subordinated to an invisible hierarchy. 
There is no way out of this vicious circle, because the warranty of reality is 
the self-identical self, conceivable only as a tightly closed reality.
It should be noted that Miłosz himself disapproved of the realist con-
ventions at least several times. In his essay “Immorality of Art” the argu-
ment starts as follows: 
The condition of strong art is its connection with reality, which cannot be in-
terpreted after the 19th-century fashion. We know that the art of the written 
word presents its durability as mimesis also in those spaces where it seems to 
run away from it, even if it is not visible all at once (Miłosz 1991: 170; trans. 
A.K.-P.). 
Later Miłosz speaks of “a historical mutation,” that is, the fact that real-
ism is historical and cannot be approached as a universal artistic method. 
Describing Kafka’s works he claims that the “so-called realistic description 
had come to its end because it is possible only when there is an individual 
endowed (…) with an orbit [environment, social context, etc.] of his own” 
(Miłosz 1992: 160). New art assumes that we do not act ourselves: it is 
language that acts through us, and we are acted upon, we are written down. 
Let us dismiss the fact that in his reasoning Miłosz introduces a simpli-
fi ed opposition between activism (artist describing reality) and passivity 
(artist as a medium), thus disregarding the possibility of transitional states. 
I am more interested in the fact that, already in the next paragraph, the 
Polish poet hurriedly backs out of his previous words and writes about the 
necessity of resistance “in the name of reality.” He adds: 
Of course, by bringing in reality, I expose myself to many misunderstandings; 
years in a seminar in philosophy would not exhaust the implications contained 
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in the term mimesis. Also, I risk inviting the phantom of realism together with 
all the epithets usually accompanying it (Miłosz 1992: 161). 
Indeed, Miłosz’s argumentation is nothing else but an instinctive reacti-
vation of the mimetic pact. Forgetting about his earlier reservations against 
naive realism, the poet returns to his starting point. He does so from the 
position of someone who realizes the hazards of the mimetic mode, yet this 
realization does not alter his perspective in the least; neither does it pre-
clude his further criticism of modernity and its languages. Miłosz mentions 
the “specter of realism,” and rightly so, but by questioning the legitimacy 
of the realism of the 19th-century novel, he defi nitely undermines his own 
position. Miłosz’s realism is often spectral and hallucinogenic, and many 
of his poems create an effect similar to that which we sometimes associate 
with the reception of hyper-realistic works: the imitation is so accurate that 
any traces of the convention are lost, and yet the gesture of imitation itself 
turns out to be hyper-conventional and artifi cial precisely because what has 
been suppressed returns with a much greater force. 
Superiority of Miłosz as a poet over Miłosz as a critic resides, among 
other things, in the fact that as a poet Miłosz often (unfortunately not al-
ways) felt exempt from the obligation to put forward unequivocal, em-
phatic theses. As a result, his best poems are open to the possibility of 
varied, sometimes contradictory, readings. I do not need to add that this is 
in effect something Anglo-American modernists were also striving for. The 
main difference would consist in their awareness of the inevitable deforma-
tion of the linguistic space, as well as in their realization that any efforts to 
contain undisputed, straightforward messages in poetic speech are not only 
futile but also counterproductive; the language that has been forced into 
unequivocality falls into a vicious circle of repetition of the same signs and 
contexts. In Miłosz’s case this awareness is silenced: it bores into the tex-
ture of many of his poems but never takes the form of an open declaration. 
On the contrary, he suppresses the thought of the subversive potential in-
herent in language, rhetoric and conventions, obsessively directing against 
it the blade of his criticism. But realism that he privileges is able to give us 
only as much as has been given to it: a world of a certain “self,” existing 
here and now, at the moment of speaking. Nothing more or, to repeat the 
title of Miłosz’s famous poem, “no more.”6
6 The poem “No more” originally published in the volume Gucio zaczarowany (Bobo’s 
Metamorphosis) is worth a separate analysis. The motif of poetic impotence is exceptional 
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If, therefore, we can at all speak of a lesson of any kind that can be 
derived from Miłosz’s statements on modernist poetry in particular and 
modern art in general, the lesson would be negative. On the one hand, it 
would involve Miłosz’s lack of agreement with the polyphonic nature of 
literary expression (what comes here to my mind are his remarks on the 
“posed voice of Polish literature”7); on the other hand, it would provide 
us with something like an overexposed photo effect discernible in many 
of his essays – we can see an outline of some constructions and structures 
that make us think of the self and not of reality, which is present only as 
a vague suggestion. 
This found its culmination in the idea that only by engaging ourselves 
in an immediate and realistic representation of reality can we prevent the 
horror of dissemination. It is in this arrested moment that I fi nd Miłosz just 
as he wanted to see himself: a poet of reality, indeed, but the reality that is 
perceived and contemplated, not a never-ending process of becoming or 
a construction of the self, of one’s identity, and of relationships with others. 
It is the position of an observer who conscientiously follows the conven-
tions informing the scholastic and Cartesian idea of the strict separation of 
consciousness and its object, the psychic and the bodily, language and real-
ity. In Miłosz’s world everything is brought to a halt for a moment and is 
outlined with a thick contour, as if the poet were afraid that the whole circle 
would break and go haywire. In fact, it is not so much a circle but a looping 
of the self, an imagination in a neutral gear willing to bolt into the world 
but forced into immobility – one great circuit.
trans. Anna Kowalcze-Pawlik
in Miłosz’s oeuvre. Regrettably, it was not developed in his later works.
7 What I have in mind is Miłosz’s essay “Mickiewicz” published in the Polish volume 
Ogród nauk (The Garden of Knowledge), where he contrasts “posed voice” with “perversi-
ties of language” (1991: 141, trans. A.K.-P.). It is therefore worth quoting the passage in 
which he connects the effects common for both language and painting: “When we stand in 
front of a painting in a museum, I cannot know what the man next to me sees in it: perhaps 
he perceives something entirely different from what I do. Similarly, it is possible to check in 
a very limited degree how our neighbour understands and interprets a page lined with poetry 
or prose. But all the differences in the modes of reception of the word or the line and colour 
get multiplied, and here we are: my neighbour and I, inhabiting two different worlds, but 
pretending we live in one. It is possible that this is pertinent for the reception of language as 
such and the whole of culture, which means that I whisper out Polish sentences in a way that 
is different from that of others, and that whatever is beautiful for some may be ugly for me, 
and vice versa” (1991: 143, trans. A.K.-P.).
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